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intrODUCtiOn
Clinical problems with significant ethical implications 
pose an ever increasing dilemma in everyday medical 
practice in the 21st century and rarely present a simple 
solution.  This is particularly the case with ethical issues 
involving children and those unable to take their own 
decisions.  Whilst the patients’ interests should come first 
and all personal, cultural and religious bias eliminated, 
the impact of costly treatment for the individual patient 
on the available healthcare resources must also be taken 
into account.  Hence, it is essential to establish an ethically 
acceptable code of practice which will allow doctors to 
provide an objective approach to management that is 
rational and consistent, both for the patient as well as 
society at large regardless of creed or culture.  An equally 
important code of practice is required for medical research, 
whether this involves clinical trials on children, laboratory 
and animal studies. Although the same general principles 
are applied to guide all medical ethical problems, these 
may be adjusted to different research scenarios. Particularly 
difficult issues relate to research involving subjects who 
are unable to fully comprehend the ethical issues at stake, 
especially the embryo, children and those with a disability, 
as well as issues relating to the initiation of intensive care 
or ‘extraordinary’ measures and, finally, issues relating to 
the discontinuation of care and the dying process.
a. GEnEraL EtHiCaL PrinCiPLEs
The ideal code of ethically-acceptable practice may be 
approached, if not fully achieved, by applying the following 
accepted principles in the decision-making process.
1. respect of the individual’s autonomy
Autonomy implies that all are free to take an active and 
totally independent role in the decision-making process. 
For this to occur, patients and study participants must 
be fully informed and understand the implications of 
their medical condition or involvement in research, any 
treatment, complications and outcome (De Lourdes, et 
al., 2003).  In practice, however, many including young 
children do not have the ability to be truly informed, and 
may rely on others for guidance.  Informed consent is not 
necessary simply to satisfy medico-legal requirements, 
but is indeed a pivotal issue with regard to patients’ ‘free 
choice’ and active participation in their own management. 
It is fraught with problems in the competent adult, and is 
doubly more difficult to achieve in minors.  Truly informed 
consent can only exist when patients are sufficiently 
informed to weigh up all the pros and cons of treatment, 
and their consent is given freely without coercion, vested 
interest or bias from physicians, researchers or third 
parties. If anything, the situation relating to children 
heightens the doctors’ and/or researchers’ responsibility 
to ensure true informed consent, albeit through third 
parties (Parekh, 2007; Smith-Tyler, 2007).
2. respect of the  
individual’s competence
Competence  implies the pat ient’s  level  of 
understanding that allows him or her to weigh up the 
ethical issues posed by a clinical situation, assimilate 
these and reach a rational decision (Parekh, 2007; 
Larcher and Hutchinson, 2010). This degree of 
comprehension is often a problem with young children 
and those with developmental disabilities, thereby 
increasing the responsibility of parents and the medical 
team to assume the role of competent advocates on their 
behalf (Cherry, 2010).
3. Respect beneficence
Beneficence defines the medical principle of ‘do no 
harm’, a hallmark of the Hippocratic oath, and should 
apply in all cases.  Medical practice frequently entails a 
compromise between benefit and harm, especially with 
regard to interventional procedures and drug therapy, 
but should always be biased toward ‘benefit’.  Hence, 
in practice, it may be perfectly acceptable to embark 
on high-risk therapy in a fully informed individual (or 
his/her advocate), provided there is a realistic chance of 
reasonable benefit.
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4. respect of the truth
There is never a case for wilfully lying to patients. 
Similarly, there is rarely any justification in withholding 
or omitting information from patients, unless this is 
deemed to be against their best interests, and this option 
only adopted after considerable in-depth reflection 
and broad consultation. For those whose ability to 
comprehend the nuances of complex medical issues is 
limited by their tender age, then this responsibility is 
passed on to third parties.
5. Respect of patient confidentiality
All patients have a right to confidentiality.  However, 
disclosure of confidential information without consent 
may be justified in situations where failure to report 
may lead to greater disadvantage to the patient, e.g. in 
some cases of child abuse.
6. avoidance of paternalism and bias
Practitioners should strive to remain truly objective 
and avoid all personal, racial, cultural, religious or other 
bias when counselling or treating patients.  Personal 
prejudice and preconceived ideas must never influence 
the provision or withholding of medical care to children, 
regardless of whether they are disadvantaged, have 
a pre-existing disability or otherwise.  The wishes of 
parents and guardians must also be respected, again 
regardless of any personal bias.
7. Avoidance of all conflicts of interest
The child must always come first, before any 
vested interest of any third party including physicians, 
parents, guardians, extended family and society (Cherry, 
2010; Chen and Fan, 2010). Numerous conflicts of 
interest may be associated with research activities (e.g 
recruitment in clinical trials, treatment arms, outcomes, 
pharmaceutical support), and cannot be allowed to 
influence any decisions whatsoever. It is ‘good practice’ 
and, indeed, should now be mandatory for all ‘interests’ 
to be declared by all co-workers and co-authors involved 
in any given research project. Special attention is 
required in the formulation of letters of instructions 
and consent forms dealing with research studies, such 
that these are specially designed to be ‘child-friendly’ 
and also account for the ultimate responsibility being 
taken by third parties.
8. respect the limitations of medical care
Medical care should strive to support the patient, and 
should be tailored to the needs of the individual.  It is 
ethically appropriate to appreciate realistic goals which 
medical care can achieve, and wrong to aim toward 
exaggerated or impossible expectations.  Hence, it is equally 
unacceptable to ‘treat at all costs’, as it is to ‘play god’.
Ethics in the  
decision-making process
Given the above accepted guidelines, ethically 
acceptable decisions can only be based on:
•	 omniscience - knowledge of all the facts
•	 omnipercipience - consideration for all the points of 
view
•	 disinterest - absence of any vested interest in the 
various parties
•	 dispassion - avoidance of any emotional bias
•	 consistency - management that is reproducible for all 
similar cases
In practice, many of the above ideals may not fully 
apply to a particular case.  For example, it is often difficult 
to completely separate disinterest and dispassion from 
children with whom an attending paediatrician has built a 
close, professional relationship.  For these reasons, it is not 
just desirable but essential to establish independent ethics 
committees to oversee particularly difficult decisions (both 
with regard to clinical medicine and research).  These 
should be composed of medical, nursing, paramedical and 
legal experts, laypersons and representatives of various 
support groups.
Conclusion
Medicine is never a pure science and contentious issues 
in management abound.  Although ‘best interest’ should 
be taken as the standard for decision-making (Spence, 
2000), in practice a single, simple solution to a given ethical 
problem in medicine is extremely unlikely, particularly in 
those patients who are either too young or incapable of 
grasping the nuances of treatment.  These patients rely 
on third parties for their decision making, and this adds a 
further dimension to an already complex situation.  It is only 
by careful attention to a strict code of ethics based upon 
respect and tolerance of other persons, whether ‘competent’ 
or not, that decisions can be taken which are truly in the 
best interest of patients and society at large.
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B. EtHiCaL issUEs rELatinG  
tO CHiLDrEn anD tHE DisaBLED
introduction
Ethical issues in child care are often complicated by 
the child’s inability to take responsibility in their own 
management decisions and, therefore, their reliance on 
third parties. This situation is further complicated in 
those children who have an underlying disability which 
may influence judgment decisions of the child’s surrogate 
guardians, both toward over or under treatment.  This 
is particularly the case with regard to decisions relating 
to life support, ongoing and quality of life, appropriate 
use of limited healthcare resources, and medical research 
(Smith-Tyler, 2007; Luce, 2003). 
The area of disability raises its own special ethical 
problems, particularly where there is total or near-total 
reliance on third parties, with their own personal bias 
and agenda that may not always be in the patient’s best 
interests.  Dilemmas are common, especially in situations 
of initiation or discontinuation of therapy, particularly 
if this involves intensive or extraordinary measures 
and where ‘best interest’ is not always easy to define 
(Armstrong, et al., 2011; Bellieni  and Buonocore, 2009).
Life support and critical intervention
A competent person has an almost unquestionable 
right to decide what to do with his/her own body, even 
when this may entail the refusal of curative or life-saving 
care (e.g. blood products and competent, consenting 
Jehovah witnesses). This ‘choice’ cannot apply to 
children, the dependent disabled and those who are 
unconscious, and this great responsibility is usually taken 
over by parents/guardians/relatives who may have widely 
differing views (Michelson, et al., 2009) and who must 
be supported by detailed, informed discussion(s) with 
the caring professionals (Bellieni  and Buonocore, 2009). 
Although the vast majority of parents act in accordance 
with their relative’s best interests this is, at times, not 
perceived to be the case by the professional team and the 
issue may need to be resolved through legal procedures 
(Cherry, 2010). Differences of opinion stem from several 
differing fundamental values including cultural and 
religious beliefs that, although not strictly essential to 
the ethico-legal principles of medicine should, if at all 
possible, be considered and respected in all cases.  Finally, 
good practice would entail the clear documentation in 
the child’s case file of all critical decisions taken by those 
interested parties (e.g. paediatrician, parents/guardians, 
nursing staff, etc), and any subsequent changes to the 
plan of management again documented accordingly.
Quality of life
Ultimately, therapy whether curative or palliative, 
strives toward achieving ‘quality of life’ (QOL).  Although 
quality of life is highly subjective, it is consistently cited 
as a major priority by parents in, for example, situations 
where withdrawal of therapy is being contemplated 
(Meyer, et al., 2002). What is acceptable QOL to one 
individual or a particular society may be abhorrent to 
another (Lam, et al., 2009). Although it is ethically wrong 
to withhold therapy simply on the basis of ‘a perceived 
disadvantage’ (e.g. a disability), it is often very difficult 
to predict the degree of disadvantage and, as a rule, 
the benefit of the doubt should be given to the patient 
(Kluge 2009).  In the critical care setting, although it 
may be acceptable to withhold therapy at the outset, 
it may be easier to initiate and withdraw treatment at a 
later date (Hussain  and Rosenkrantz 2003).  The latter 
allows for a trial period during which time the child’s 
response, severity and irreversibility of their disease can 
be established beyond doubt.  Indeed, both under- or 
over-treatment is wrong and a modus operandi which 
balances the two should apply in all cases.
Healthcare and resource constraints
In an ideal world, all treatments should be available 
to all patients a t all times, regardless of age, gender, 
race, creed, social status and pre-existing disease or 
disability (co-morbidity).  Modern medical care, and 
especially intensive and high dependency therapy, is 
extremely expensive and in limited supply, even in 
developed countries.  In practice, this inevitably leads to 
an overt or covert system of health care rationing which, 
in the context of society at large, is ethically reasonable 
(Sabik and Lie, 2008). However, it may lead to negative 
discrimination against those who, for whatever reason 
be it medical, social, cultural or otherwise, may be 
considered to be ‘less deserving’ (Zlotnik Shaul  and 
Vitale, 2009; Antommaria, Sweney and Poss, 2010). 
Hence great care is required to ensure that any rationing 
is reasonable and that any inclusion/exclusion criteria 
for these patients are fair and ethically acceptable 
(Kluge, 2009; Antommaria, Sweney and Poss, 2010; 
Miljeteig, et al., 2010).
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Euthanasia
Passive euthanasia allows patients to die naturally of 
their underlying disease and is generally acceptable in 
those with irreversible disease.  Although this does not 
include active intervention, passive euthanasia ensures 
supportive and palliative care at all times.  Furthermore, 
it does not justify a decision not to treat on the basis 
of an underlying disability.  Active euthanasia, by 
positively helping a patient to expedite his/her demise, is 
considered unlawful in most but not all countries (Kon, 
2009). Indeed, although prosecuted, individuals have 
been found not guilty to the charge of assisted murder 
after they have admitted to help a loved one take their 
own life, even in countries where this provision is not 
empowered by law. The Dutch protocol goes further in 
that it lays down criteria for legitimately euthanizing 
neonates whose medical condition falls within three 
defined categories and is incompatible with sustained 
life (Kon, 2009). Although gaining wider support and 
acceptance, such active euthanasia is generally difficult 
to accept by third parties. It remains, therefore, more 
difficult to apply to neonates, children and dependent 
individuals who are unable to make an informed request 
for this to be carried out.  Furthermore, it allows no room 
for error and further obscures the cut-off limits of what 
is and what is not ethically acceptable practice.
Medical research and children
A significant proportion of the benefits resulting from 
biomedical research will help future patients rather than 
those directly involved in the research (Matutina, 2009). 
Given that patients should never be used as a means to 
an end, and difficulties with informed consent in the 
non-competent child or disabled person (Parekh, 2007; 
Larcher and Hutchinson, 2010), it is hard to reconcile the 
participation of these groups in active research.  However, 
a total ban on such research activity will restrict other 
children and disabled patients from benefiting from any 
potential advances. ‘Good practice’ research involves 
randomisation, use of placebos, and similar concepts 
that may be very difficult if not impossible for many, 
but especially for children, to comprehend (Matutina, 
2009). Research trials must be unbiased, and avoid 
any discrimination whilst protecting all participants 
(Diekema, 2008). ‘Negative’ findings may be equally if 
not more important than ‘positive’ results in research 
that aims to add to dependable, evidence-based medical 
practice (Henschel, Rothenberger and Boos, 2010). To 
this end, therefore, clear ethical, legal and methodological 
guidelines are essential in the design and conduct of 
clinical trials involving all subjects, but especially children 
(Henschel, Rothenberger and Boos, 2010; Burns, 2003; 
Coleman, 2007).
Conclusion
In many ways, the ethics which govern the 
management of those with a disability are no different 
to those which apply for children.  The respect for 
autonomy and confidentiality, avoidance of conflict 
and paternalism whilst aiming for acting in the child’s 
interests with honesty should apply for all.  However, the 
disabled subgroup with its inherent potential for negative 
discrimination when it comes to healthcare support does 
need greater attention particularly in the areas of critical 
care where the issue of realistic goals is paramount.  The 
problem of defining quality of life is highlighted in this 
subgroup, and it is important that physicians accept 
that others including relatives, may have widely differing 
views on this definition and should strive to respect their 
divergent views, provided it is ultimately in the patient’s 
interest.  Finally, an effort to respect children and the 
disabled as individuals with an equal right to healthcare, 
will facilitate acceptance of their position and/or disability 
and ensure fairness in their management. 
C. EtHiCaL issUEs rELatinG  
tO tHE DyinG PrOCEss in CHiLDrEn
introduction
Despite the application of robust ethical principles, 
complex issues in patient care commonly result in ethical 
dilemmas with no clear answers.  This is especially so 
in those ‘life and death’ decisions relating to continuing 
curative therapy or opting for palliative care (Spence, 
2000; Lam, et al., 2009). As with many situations in 
medicine, and probably more so in paediatrics, these 
decisions are complicated by difficulties in establishing 
clear prognostic outcomes both in terms of disease 
progression and timescales, patient’s reliance on third 
parties, and appropriate use of resources (Kluge, 2009; 
Sabik and Lie, 2008; Brook and Hain, 2008). Great efforts 
are required to ensure family members are fully informed 
of the evolving clinical situation relating to their loved 
one, and helping them to accept the inevitability of death. 
Whenever possible, they should be encouraged to plan 
for their relative or child’s death in a manner that is most 
appropriate for them as an individual family.  This section 
will explore the ethical principles which offer guidance 
in these situations, and strives toward: i) establishing 
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the acceptance of death by the patient and family, ii) 
ensuring ‘quality time’ for both family and their dying 
relative or child and, iii) safeguarding every person’s right 
to die with dignity.
the dying process in children
Fortunately, most childhood illness is curable and, 
indeed, death in childhood is an unlikely event in 2011. 
Often death is not a totally unexpected event but can 
usually be anticipated after a short or long term illness 
(Brook and Hain, 2008). For these children, a point is 
reached when cure is no longer possible and is replaced 
by palliative care.  Not uncommonly, this transition 
can be complicated by ethical dilemmas.  Many of the 
decisions relating to the dying child are complex, and 
invariably have a significant impact on the child as an 
individual, his/her family and friends, as well as society 
at large.  If this transition is to be appropriate and 
acceptable, a code of practice based on sound ethical 
values is essential.
When to opt for care and not cure?
This difficult milestone requires a multidisciplinary 
decision involving the patient, whenever possible, the 
family, relatives, friends and the entire team of carers 
(Hechler, 2008; Brien, Duffy and Shea, 2010).  Stopping 
curative therapy will depend on medical considerations 
such as patient viability, futility of further aggressive 
therapy, and the exhaustion of all reasonable, potentially 
curative options.  The patient must be ‘ready’ for the 
transition (with appropriate, sensitive discussion in 
competent adults and the older child).  The importance 
of family acceptance of palliation versus cure cannot 
be stressed enough and requires frank discussion, 
often over several hours (Hechler, 2008). Finally, but 
equally important, the acceptance of carers must never 
be overlooked and the personal view of each individual 
should be actively explored (Duffy and Shea, 2010; 
Floriani, 2010). Ultimately, a unified team decision is 
required to avoid conflict that will only add to the distress 
of the patient and his/her family.
Medical ethics that apply  
to palliative care
The transition to palliation in critically ill children 
does not involve a special set of medical ethics.  Indeed, 
the appropriate application of basic principles provides 
the platform on which difficult issues can be discussed 
and ethically acceptable decisions taken.  Hence, carers 
should strive toward the patient’s best interests 
whilst respecting the patient’s autonomy within the 
confines of his/her competence.  They should respect 
confidentiality, avoid being paternalistic, anticipate 
and avoid conflict (Masri, 2000). All issues should be 
aired realistically, honestly and sympathetically, with 
due consideration for the patient’s/family’s views, 
beliefs and wishes.  As with other ethical dilemmas, 
for medical decisions to be ethically acceptable, they 
should be based on all the facts and points of view, free 
of bias and emotional overtones, and consistent from 
one patient to another.
Despite this ideal, the decision making process is 
rarely straightforward in practice.  Often an accurate 
prediction of outcome (and time-scales) may be 
difficult in the critically ill, and especially children. 
Prolongation of life through palliative care raises the 
issue of quality of life (Michelson, et al., 2009; Meyer, 
et al., 2002), an extremely subjective issue dependent 
on personality, inherent expectations (realistic or 
otherwise), cultural background, religious beliefs and 
pressure from third parties.  Nevertheless, the caring 
team have a primary duty to maintain the quality of 
life at all times of, firstly, the child and, secondly, that 
of the family.  In addition, they must present an honest 
assessment of the medical condition with realistic goals 
and argue toward the reasonableness, or otherwise, of 
continuing support.  In practice, this cannot be done 
without taking account of available resources, although 
healthcare ‘rationing’ in the terminally ill child can 
pose a great challenge.
Moreover, these problems are made doubly difficult 
in patients and children who are unable to grasp 
the complex issues involved and, therefore, cannot 
participate in the decision process and depend on third 
parties, usually their immediate family members (Moro, 
et al., 2006). In the vast majority of cases, the latter 
correctly decides what is right for their loved one and 
for them as a family, and the role of the caring team 
is essentially to support and facilitate their decisions. 
Rarely family members may, knowingly or unwittingly, 
hold strong views that may be biased by their own 
fears/beliefs and may not be in their relative or child’s 
interest.  At this point the caring professionals may 
be required to gently redress any misguided views to 
ensure that the dying person is not put through any 
unnecessary suffering.  Once a decision for palliative 
and not curative care is taken, the unified focus should 
be toward support, quality and not quantity of life.
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The final stages
Toward the later stages of palliative care respect 
must be shown for the wishes of the patient, the family 
and carers in the light of their background, culture and 
creed.  Throughout the dying process, great attention 
must be paid to the child and his family’s needs, both 
physical and emotional (Moro, et al., 2006). Whenever 
possible, decisions relating to Where to die?, With whom? 
and How? should be planned with the family (Floriani, 
2010). What may be the ideal for one family may be 
abhorrent for another.  Every effort should be made to 
enroll all support services (e.g. Hospice movement, social 
workers, friends, etc) in order to fulfill the patient’s and 
the family’s wishes.   Certainly in the majority of expected 
deaths (e.g. cancer relapse) this is eminently feasible, but 
it is extremely difficult with sudden, unexpected deaths 
(e.g. post-accidental).  
The fact that each child will die only once and that 
this is invariably a major event for loved ones should form 
the basis for a modus operandi that strives to ensure that 
death is as ‘acceptable’ as possible. A concerted drive 
to respect the patient’s and family’s wishes, to ensure 
‘quality time’, and ‘humanize’ the dying process can help 
enormously in allowing loved ones to ‘let go with resigned 
acceptance’.  In this re gard, the spiritual needs of the 
family must be taken into consideration (Feudtner, Haney 
and Dimmers, 2003; Fleischman, et al., 1994), and a 
conscious effort made to ask the family if they would like 
the appropriate religious counsellor to attend.  Equally, 
it is important to respect the wishes of those who do 
not hold any particular religious beliefs and it is wrong 
to attempt to introduce this, in whatever guise, during 
the final moments. It is entirely appropriate to decide, 
together with the family, against active resuscitation 
and the initiation of further extraordinary (but futile) 
measures.  Indeed, there is little to compare death after 
a frantic resuscitative attempt often in the absence of 
family or friends, with the peaceful death of a child in his/
her mother’s arms or an adult in tranquil surroundings 
offering sufficient privacy, quietly surrounded by loved 
ones. Finally, the needs of the surviving family members 
must not be underestimated and addressed appropriately 
(Meert, et al., 2007).
Conclusion
For critically ill patients, cure should not be pursued 
at all costs and there may come a time when cure is 
impossible and palliative care is in the patient’s best 
interest.  Certainly, appropriate supportive care should 
continue at all times and must include the patient’s family 
and friends.  Acceptance of death is very important, 
particularly for the family, and can only be achieved after 
sympathetic, often prolonged and repeated discussion 
with loved ones.  Palliation should provide ‘quality time’ 
for both family and their dying relative and, ultimately, 
strive for one overriding goal: namely, to safeguard the 
patient’s right to die with dignity.
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